This paper examines the performance of active US domestic real estate mutual funds (REMFs), both before and after fund managers' compensation. We consider both the REMF industry as a whole, and also individual funds, separately against stock market and real estate market benchmarks. For individual funds, the cross-section bootstrap method is used to separate fund managers' genuine skills from luck. We find that the REMF industry, as a whole, can beat a real estate market benchmark; but we find that the REMF industry cannot beat the stock market or the combined benchmark even when operating expenses are not taken into account. For individual REMFs, we find genuine stock-picking skills, net of operating expenses, for nearly 30% of funds in the performance distribution, relative to the real estate sector benchmark, but no outperformance against the stock market. The proportion of skilled managers shrinks to no more than 10% when the combined benchmark is used.
Introduction
It might be supposed that investors in actively managed mutual funds are looking for outperformance from talented managers. Investors have to be prepared to pay for such talent, as actively managed funds charge about 100 basis points annually compared to passive index funds which charge roughly 20 basis points. 1 However, identifying managers with talent is a non-trivial exercise because good past performance could simply be the result of luck. Moreover, even if managers are talented enough to generate gross outperformance, it is possible that this is cancelled by their operating expenses. In this paper, we consider the gross and net performance of Real Estate Mutual Funds (REMFs), which invest mainly in securitized real estate investments. We extend the analyses hitherto undertaken by using a bootstrap approach.
And we classify the U.S. domestic REMFs based on their portfolio holdings, after all the securities in the portfolios are specified.
REMFs and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) have grown rapidly since the mid 1990s. REMFs seek outperformance by investing predominantly in specialized real estate securities, such as U.S. domestic REITs. This could be considered contrary to the conventional understanding on portfolio diversification theory to minimize the idiosyncratic risks. This apparent excessive risk-taking behavior could be justified by fund managers' specialist ability to generate outperformance through their superior knowledge and skills in selecting undervalued securities in a particular sector.
We use alpha measure to examine outperformance. This requires the definition of an appropriate benchmark. Earlier studies of REMFs suggest that the results are sensitive to the choice of benchmark (Lin and Yung, 2004; Hartzell et al., 2010) , and spend much effort attempting to define a customised benchmark that is suitable for 1 Based on the expense ratio data from CRSP US Mutual Fund database, and ICI Investment Company Institute. The net returns of fund is its gross returns net of operating expenses, which are paid out from fund's net asset on a daily basis by fund manager. Operating expenses, or 'expense ratio', are normally shown as percentage of fund's asset under management. real estate investment. Various benchmarks have been used, including passive real estate sector indices and passive portfolio required returns based on asset pricing models. In this paper, we employ the sector indexes and classic asset pricing models as benchmarks. These are both practical and theoretically sound. The multi-factor asset pricing model and its risk factors are empirically and theoretically driven, and have a well-established literature, which justifies its use as benchmark for stock market. However, there is no established and generally-accepted literature on the real estate factor or real estate customised pricing models, thus we use the passive index as the benchmark for real estate sector. We take care in the construction of two appropriate benchmarks for the analysis. We consider four questions relating to the performance of REMFs, in terms of 'beating the real estate market' and 'beating the stock market'. The first two questions consider the performance of the REMFs industry as a whole; the second two consider individual fund performance. For the first two, the U.S. domestic REMF industry is constructed both as an equal and a value-weighted portfolio.
First, we consider the performance of the U.S. domestic REMF industry against the securitized real estate market as a whole in order to assess whether the REMFs exhibit stock selection skills within real estate. This requires a specific benchmark both representing the expected returns from the real estate market and matching the characteristics of the securities in REMFs portfolios. Such a fund characteristicsbased benchmark has the advantages over others of validity and accuracy. The benchmark chosen should closely mimic the risk exposure of portfolio holdings of REMFs, after all the securities held by funds are specified. Second, we examine if the U.S. domestic REMF industry is able to beat the general stock market. This benchmark is obtained from the Carhart four-factor model as the required returns from the passive portfolio after taking into account zero-cost size, growth and momentum strategies. We do so to examine the motivation for sector specification.
Third, we use a panel of US domestic active REMFs to examine whether some REMF managers outperform our real estate benchmark. Finally, we consider indi-vidual fund performance against the stock market. A key part of our approach to the examination of individual fund performance is the use of a cross-sectional bootstrap to control for the influence of luck. This does not require an assumption of normality of funds returns, a factor overlooked by many earlier studies. Moreover, to deal with possible serial correlation of fund return rates, the block bootstrap is also used to check the robustness of the results. The analysis is conducted both before and after fund operating expenses, so we can examine if some fund managers have genuine and sufficient skills to outperform once operating expenses are taken into account. Throughout, we examine fund performance using both gross and net monthly return rates. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the literature on the performance of US domestic actively managed REMFs. Section 3 explains the data used in this study. Section 4 then outlines the methodology, specifically the asset pricing models used to represent required return rates in the stock market, and the passive real estate sector benchmark. Additionally, the baseline cross-section bootstrap procedure is also introduced. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and section 6 summarizes the main findings and draws conclusions.
Literature Review
The predominant approach in the literature to the measurement of fund outperformance is to use alpha. This captures the performance of a fund as its realized returns in excess of the expected or required returns of a passive managed portfolio following similar investment strategies and risk exposures. The statistical significance of alpha, normally assessed by its t-test, indicates the existence of abnormal performance and, therefore, managers' stock-picking skills.
A benchmark can be considered to be a comparable passive alternative to an active fund. The benchmark can either come from using risk factor models with solid theoretical basis, such as CAPM, Fama-French or Carhart, or simply by using a pre-existing public available index to represent the market. In studies of the performance of mutual funds, the benchmark derived from the Carhart four-factor model is interpreted as expected returns of a passively-managed well diversified portfolio in the market (Carhart, 1997; Fama and French, 2010) . It consists of the value-weighted composite market portfolio risk factor of Jensen (1968) , the size and growth risk factors proposed by Fama and French (1993) , and the momentum risk factor introduced by Carhart (1997) .
Numerous studies have been conducted to examine the performance and skills related to the active management of U.S. domestic equity mutual funds (Carhart, 1997; Christopherson et al., 1998; Kosowski et al., 2006; Fama and French, 2010) .
The overall conclusion is that there is no strong evidence of superior stock-picking skills but there is of underperformance. Among the studies of mutual funds performance, Carhart (1997) examines the risk-adjusted returns of US equity mutual funds, between 1963 to 1993, and suggested that funds performances are based on the ranked deciles of past returns for a relatively short period, and this ex post sorting is subject to luck. Many of these funds outperform the benchmark by luck, and the analysis generates false positive results to support the existence of fund managers' superior skills.
Another concern is the assumption of normality in fund returns, which is imposed in most of the mutual funds performance studies. However, empirical evidence of the violation on this restrictive assumption is found in other mutual fund studies (Kosowski et al., 2006; Fama and French, 2010) . This undermines the validity of the t-test on alpha.
To control for the influence of luck on performance, and for the non-normality of returns, a cross-section bootstrap has been used. Such studies all indicate the existence of some skilled managers (Kosowski et al., 2006; Fama and French, 2010) . Kosowski et al. (2006) , in their examination of the returns of US domestic equity mutual funds from 1975 to 2002, net of operating expenses, find that a minority of funds possesses genuine skills to produce outperformance even when operating expenses are taken into account. Similar results are found by Barras et al. (2010) and Fama and French (2010) . Barras et al. (2010) , in a study of net fund performance from 1975 to 2006, find a significant proportion of skilled funds before 1996 but none after 1996. They attribute this downturn to the possibilities of increasing market efficiency, inadequate skills of fund managers, and moving of skilled fund manager to hedge funds. Fama and French (2010) examine the net returns of funds from 1984 to 2006 and find few funds generate risk-adjusted returns to cover the expenses and fees. But they find evidence of superior skills after adding costs back to net returns. Daniel and Wermers (1997) develop and apply a benchmark based on the characteristics of portfolios holdings to measure the performance of actively managed funds, and find some funds have stock selection skills. Similar results have been found for sector mutual funds by Dellva and Smith (2001) , who test the stock-selection skills of funds managers using a series of industry benchmarks and conclude that many sector fund managers are skillful in picking undervalued securities. However, they also express their concern that the results are sensitive to the choice of benchmark. Kacperczyk et al. (2005) claim that the reason sector fund managers deviate from a well-diversified portfolio and, instead, concentrate on certain industries, is because of their information advantage. They also find evidence of management abilities for some sector concentrated fund managers.
REMFs are sector equity funds which specialize in real estate. To qualify as a real estate mutual fund, according to the Investment Company Institute, SEC, and Investment Company Act 1940, a fund must invest over 80% of its total investment in securities that mainly engage in real estate operations. Such specialized sector equity funds are exposed to real estate sector risk. Many studies employ the US passive stock index or real estate sector index as the benchmark for fund's returns, net of operating expenses, to measure REMF performance (Kallberg et al., 2000; Gallo et al., 2000; O'Neal and Page, 2000; Lin and Yung, 2004; Rodriguez, 2007; Chiang et al., 2008) . The use of a real estate market index as the benchmark is justified by the excess sector risk exposure of REMF portfolios holdings towards the real estate industry, compared with other well diversified funds.
Specifically, by applying simple passive index benchmarks, earlier researchers tend to find evidence for outperformance (Kallberg et al., 2000; Gallo et al., 2000) , although later studies show no sign of significant outperformance when both a passive market index benchmark and passive portfolio benchmark from a risk factor model are used (Lin and Yung, 2004; Chiang et al., 2008) . Kallberg et al. (2000) find strong and robust evidence for outperformance on 44 REMFs from 1986 to 1998, irrespective of various benchmark applications -CAPM, Fama-French three factor models, or passive real estate market index proxied by Wilshire Real Estate Index and NAREIT Index. Gallo et al. (2000) find outperformance among 24 REMFs for the period of 1991 to 1997 when the Wilshire Real Estate Index is employed.
In contrast to the findings of outperformance by Kallberg et al. (2000) and Gallo et al. (2000) , more recent studies (such as O'Neal and Page, 2000; Lin and Yung, 2004; Rodriguez, 2007; Chiang et al., 2008) Most of the earlier studies examine performance using only the net returns of funds (Kallberg et al., 2000; Gallo et al., 2000; O'Neal and Page, 2000; Lin and Yung, 2004; Rodriguez, 2007; Chiang et al., 2008) , and overlook the interaction between fund's expense costs and performance. Unlike the other REMF studies, Hartzell et al. (2010) examine funds' returns before and net of costs and find evidence of outperformance with respect to an index benchmarks derived from NAREIT and Wilshire. They investigate three sets of REIT-based benchmarks, including a characteristic factor, a property type factor and a statistical factor, and a set of index benchmarks for non-REIT real estate firms, namely homebuilders and REOCs.
And they find the performance is subject to the choice of benchmarks. One final issue is survivor bias. The findings on outperformance in the literature are subject to the in-built survivor bias of the data sources, such as Morningstar (Kallberg et al., 2000; Gallo et al., 2000; O'Neal and Page, 2000; Rodriguez, 2007; Chiang et al., 2008) and Yahoo Finance Lin and Yung (2004) , which causes overestimation of outperformance.
This review of the literature suggests four issues that require attention: the need to consider outperformance, both gross and net of operating expenses; the problem of survivor bias; the need to use a bootstrap approach to deal with outperformance attributable to luck and with non-normality in returns; and the importance of benchmark choice. Accordingly, we consider gross and net returns, we use data from CRSP which is free from survivor bias and we employ the cross-section bootstrap used by Kosowski et al. (2006) . Finally, we use benchmarks of both the stock market and the real estate sector. Mutual funds tend to offer different shareclasses to investors, where the classes differ regarding their contribution to annual operating expenses including management expenses, brokerage commissions, distribution fees (12b-1 fees) and other general expenses. In addition, the shareclasses also differ with respect to additional shareclass-specific charges, such as front-end loads, back-end loads or deferred sales charge. The CRSP mutual fund database reports net returns for each shareclass, which are gross returns after deduction of operating expenses including management expenses and 12b-1 fees, but before the deduction of shareclass-specific charges. We aggregate the net returns of the different shareclasses by using a weighted average, with the TNAs of the shareclasses as weights. 6 This fund net return 7 is the return the average investor receives after operating expenses.
CRSP may duplicate the returns histories for newly-introduced shareclasses when a fund splits into multiple shareclasses. Aggregating net returns as weighted average of shareclasses will avoid the bias by choosing only one single shareclass. Monthly fund gross returns are computed by aggregating same-portfolio shareclasses gross returns after adding 1/12th of their yearly expense ratios to their net returns. 8 5 According to SEC and Investment Company Act 1940, any strategic change on fund policy need to be notified to SEC and disclosed in prospectus.
6 According to CRSP Mutual Fund data documentation, the data directly reported from CRSP are at the shareclass level, and required to be aggregated to generate the data at the fund family. They suggest splitting the 'fund name' by semicolon into the fund family name and share class, which is also adopted in this study. However, this name search method can not distinguish all shareclasses thoroughly, thus we also additionally use the approach by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009), by using the management company as the identifier for the shareclasses in the same fund family.
7 For those funds whose monthly returns are not continuous, normally with gaps observed during 1982 to 1989, the following non-missing return after these missing values will be deleted because CRSP cumulated the last non-missing return to fill in this (Kosowski et al., 2006) . 8 The management expenses are normally imposed as a fixed percentage of the fund's asset under
As we want to examine the performance of all actively-managed U.S. domestic
REMFs, we ignore all passively-managed REMFs. 9 Table C1 shows for each year of the sample period the number of such U.S.
domestic REMFs (N t ), the total net asset value of the domestic REMFs industry (TNA t = TNA i,t ), and the concentration in the domestic REMFs sector as measured by the Herfindahl Index.
The second and the third column show that the number of funds and the money under management was mostly increasing throughout the period. The growth of the sector also resulted in a less concentrated distribution of funds. Analysis of REMFs' security holdings using the information available since 2002 reveals that, on average, about 90% 10 of fund money is invested in U.S. REITs. Most of the remainder is invested in U.S. real estate operating companies (REOCs). For comparison, Table C1 gives information on the growth of the listed U.S. REITs sector in four and five, using data from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT). 11
[ Table C1 about here] Figure C1 plots the TNAs of REMFs and the market capitalization of listed REITs.
management, and deducted from fund's TNA on the daily basis by the fund's management company to compensate their active management skills. And they are typically included inside expense ratio, which is expressed as the percentage of AUM. After 1980, the marketing and distribution costs, also quoted as '12b-1 fees', are incorporated in the expense ratio, and they vary across different shareclasses within the same fund family. Net Return as reported in CRSP = Gross Return (Return before Operating Expenses) -Operating Expenses. Under the condition that a fund's expense ratio goes missing for certain years, we assume it is the same as other actively managed funds with similar AUM. Then the fund shareclasses can be aggregated to get the gross returns at the fund level (Fama and French, 2010) . 9 Before June 2008, the CRSP database provides no information on the management style of a fund. To identify index funds before that date, we follow the procedure of Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) and details on the procedure are presented in appendix B.
10 See appendix A. 11 As not all U.S. REITs are listed, this gives only an indication of the growth of the sector.
Important events for the REITs sector during the sample period are also indicated.
Overall, the growth of the REITs sector is accompanied by the growth of funds that specialize in investing in such securities.
[ Figure C1 about here]
An important event was the U.S. REITs IPO boom, which was caused by low real estate prices and structural innovations in the sector. This increased the amount of available securities and spurred growth of the REMFs industry. Table C2 shows the number of actively-managed U.S. domestic REMFs for different 5-year subperiods with and without full sample observations. It also reports the average gross and net returns and also both returns as excess above the risk-free rate.
[ Table C2 about here]
Comparing gross and net returns, we see that the average investor is prepared to pay about 100 basis points for a skilled fund manager. The excess returns are always positive and fund managers are able on average to generate returns better than the risk-free rate. The returns of long-lived funds (with at least 5 years of observations)
are not substantially different from those short-lived funds.
Benchmarks
The choice of a benchmark to measure the performance of REMFs requires understanding of their risk exposure. As REMFs hold predominantly U.S. REITs and REOCs, we use the all REITs index from FTSE/NAREIT and the U.S. real estate securities index from Wilshire as passive sector benchmarks. The FTSE/NAREIT index covers the listed REITS sector and the Wilshire index covers the large cap REITs and REOCs. The latter might be more representative of the U.S. listed real estate market. Table C3 gives summary statistics for both indices. The statistics for both indices are very similar and the returns of both are highly correlated (correlation coefficients exceeding 0.98).
[ Table C3 about here]
If we compare the average returns of the two sector indices with the average returns of the bottom column of Table C2 , then we see that established REMFs produced higher returns. This might indicate manager skills, but could also be the result of luck.
We use the four-model of Carhart (1997) as benchmark for the general U.S. stock market. The model adds a momentum factor to the well-known three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) . The time series observations for the four factors are from French's webpage. We provide no summary statistics here.
Methodology
In return-based performance studies, the observed returns are regressed on factors that mimic a passive benchmark with a similar exposure to market risk. The regression includes a constant, which should be zero if the observed returns just compensate for the risk taken. If the constant is positive, then the manager generating the returns has talent. In our application, we use the following two benchmark models
and
In Eq. 2, R i is the excess return of fund i and SEC is the excess return of the sector benchmark. We use Eq. 2 for testing if REMFs, as a fund sector and individually, can outperform the securitized real estate stock market. Eq. 3 regresses the excess return of fund i on the four-factor model, where M KT is the excess return of the value-weighted aggregate market portfolio of stocks traded at the NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ, SM B is the size risk factor, HM L is the value growth risk factor, and M OM is the momentum risk factor. We use the four-factor model, because no passive benchmark is available for the whole stock market. Further, the Carhart four-factor model is theoretically sound and has the most prevailing explanatory and predictive power on US stock market returns. Carhart four-factor model can be interpreted as the required returns of a passive portfolio representing the stock market by replicating the zero-investment market, size, value/growth strategies (Carhart, 1997) . According to Fama and French (2010) , the four-factor model predicts the required return rates for a well-diversified passive stock portfolio. We use Eq. 3
for testing if REMFs, as a fund sector and individually, can outperform the stock market.
If the manager of fund i has skills relative to the sector benchmark, then α i > 0.
However, because this alpha is not observed and has to be estimated, inference has to be conducted correctly. An unskilled fund manager could have a positive estimated alpha simply by good luck. If we assumed that the idiosyncratic return component ε i,t are iid distributed, then we could test the null of α i = 0 using the standard t-test, where this statistic should be asymptotically normally-distributed under the null.
However, given the short history of many REMFs, this asymptotic result might be of no relevance for the true distribution of the t-test statistic under the null. We could assume that the idiosyncratic return component is independently, identically and normally-distributed, but, according to Kosowski et al. (2006) , the presence of idiosyncratic risk-taking among funds makes this assumption not realistic. Further, there is ample empirical evidence that returns of stocks follow non-normal distributions, and those portfolios, consisting of such stock, can exhibit similar non-normal characteristics.
Instead of relying on an asymptotic parametric distribution for inference, we follow Kosowski et al. (2006) and use the bootstrap to simulate the true distribution of estimated alphas and the t-statistic under the null that fund managers have no skills. The procedure works as follows. For each fund, and given a benchmark model, we firstly fit the model to the actual returns of an individual fund and keep the estimated factor loadings β m,i (this can be a vector, depending on the benchmark model) and the residuals ε i,t . 12 We then generate, for each fund, notional return histories under the null of no talent by using the parametric bootstrap. In particular, we draw randomly with replacement from the residuals and compute Since many funds only exist for a relatively short period of time but engage in excessive risk-taking strategies, thus they may gain positive alphas along with high standard error for alphas. The t-statistics, typically as the alpha scaled by its standard error, is employed to calibre the extent and significance of abnormal performance cross funds. As the t-statistic is pivotal, we prefer it for inference.
To assess if the REMF industry as a whole has skilled managers, on average, we compute for each month the returns of a portfolio that invests in all individual US domestic active REMFs available. This implies that this REMF industry portfolio is rebalanced at a monthly frequency. Thus, the returns of REMF industry portfolio are calculated as the equal-weighted and value-weighted average of all existing domestic active REMFs. We then fit one of the benchmark models from Eqs. 2 and 3 to the returns of this active REMFs portfolio. This results in an estimate of the actual alpha and its t-statistic. To assess if portfolio alpha is statistically different from zero, we need to construct the simulated distribution of alpha estimates under the null hypothesis that managers on average have no talent. To do so, we estimate the bootstrapped alpha and the t-statistic for each of the 1000 notional returns data generated under the null with the parametric bootstrap. We use the same benchmark model in these regressions as was used in the regression for the actual returns.
Effectively, we fit
For each regression, we obtain the estimated alpha and its t-statistic. As we have 1000 bootstrapped observation for each, we can use their bootstrapped distributions to assess if the actual alpha of a portfolio is really significant and, accordingly, draw inferences on whether managers, on average, have skills.
To assess if individual REMFs have skilled managers, we first use the actual returns and estimate for each fund alpha and its t-statistic. We then order the estimated alphas according to their size. We then use the notional bootstrap returns data to estimate the distribution for each of the ordered alphas under the null. In particular, for each bootstrap replication b, we fit R b i,t = α b i + x t β b m,i + ε i,t for each fund and rank the estimated alphas and the estimated t-statistics. We repeat this exercise for all 1000 bootstrap samples and obtain in the end the distribution of alphas and t-statistic under the null for the smallest alpha, the second smallest alpha and so on. These empirical estimated distributions allow us to draw inference on the actual alphas (t-statistics). For instance, we compare the smallest estimated actual alpha (t-statistic) with the distribution estimated with the smallest alpha (t-statistic) from the 1000 bootstrap replications. If the actual alpha (t-statistic) estimate is unlikely under the simulated null distribution (given a significance level), then we reject the hypothesis that the fund manager with the smallest estimated actual alpha has no skills.
Empirical results

Performance of REMF industry
We use the sector benchmark model from Eq. 2 to assess the performance of the active REMF industry relative to the real estate market. The Wilshire index is used as sector benchmark. To assess the performance of the active REMFs sector relative to the stock market, we use the Carhart regression from Eq. 3 as the benchmark model. We conduct the analysis for equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios of all funds in the market. This implies implicit rebalancing, as new funds might enter the market in a given month and others might leave the sector. We assess the performance of these portfolios both before (gross excess returns) and after the deduction of operating expenses (net excess returns). Table C4 shows the results.
[ Table C4 about here]
Columns two and four of Table C4 show that the active REMFs can beat the passive sector benchmark on average when gross returns are used. The estimated alphas for the equal-weighted and the value-weighted portfolios are both positive and significant at the 5% level. Once expenses are taken into account, the result stays robust.
The estimated alphas are still statistically significant at the 5% level. This implies that the average investor can benefit from the average fund manager talent in the active REMF industry. The result is not affected qualitatively once we include the FTSE/NAREIT index as additional regressor into the benchmark model from Eq. 2, see columns three and seven.
Column four of Table C4 shows that the REMF industry, represented by an equal-weighted portfolio of all active funds, has a positive, but insignificant alpha relative to the stock market (at the 5% level). This result holds both for the parametric distribution assumption and when the simulated distribution is used. After expenses, the estimated alpha decreases and stays positive, but again is insignificant at the usual significance levels. We obtain the same qualitative result when a value-weighted portfolio is used, see column eight. When both the real estate sector and stock market benchmark are combined, the alphas of REMF industry shrink compared with that of Wilshire sector benchmark, but stay significant and positive.
The alphas becomes insignificant after bootstrap, which implies that the average investor can not benefit from the average fund manager talent in the active REMF industry, see column five and nine.
Finding no qualitative difference between the results for equal-and value-weighted sector portfolios reflects that the REMF industry is not very concentrated. The last column in Table C4 shows that the real estate stock market, proxied by Wilshire Real Estate Securities Index, does not outperform the general stock market. Table C5 shows the results for the performance evaluation of individual active REMF funds relative to the real estate market. The results are presented in Table C5 and ordered along the estimated actual t-Statistic for alpha. For instance, the bottom fund had the smallest t-Statistics for the estimated alpha from the regression in Eq. 2, the second fund the second lowest and so on. Focussing on the gross returns first, the parametric P-Values let us conclude that the two bottom funds have managers with value destroying skills, as their estimated alpha is significantly negative. The true distribution, estimated with the bootstrap, however, tells a different story. Under the simulated distribution, it is not unlikely that the two lowest ranked funds in a population of funds with no skills have t-Statistics identical to those observed for the two lowest ranked funds in the U.S. domestic REMF industry. There are also differences regarding the inference for funds ranked above the median. The simulated distribution indicates that the fund in the 40% percentile seems to be able to beat the sector benchmark at a 5% significance level, whereas we would not conclude this when using the parametric distribution for inference. Overall, nearly 40% of active REMFs can beat the sector benchmark on a risk-adjusted basis. No fund underperforms the sector benchmark.
Performance of individual REMF managers
[ Table C5 about here]
Taking a look at the results for net returns, we see that several funds still outperform the U.S. real estate market once operating expenses for fund have been taken into account 13 . The bootstrapped distribution also shows that the top fund with the largest t-Statistic is actually talented, not just lucky. We would reject the null of no talent using the parametric P-Value, and the bootstrapped P-Value at the 5% significance level. We are aware that we encounter the problem of multiple testing here, as we would expect 0.05 × 90 = 4.5 funds with significant alpha estimates even if all alphas were zero. 14 However, because we observe more than 5 funds with significant alphas, we conclude that some active REMFS can outperform the sector before and after operating expenses. Table C6 shows the results for the performance evaluation of individual active REMF funds relative to the stock market where we use the Carhart regression from Eq. 3 as benchmark model.
[ Table C6 about here] We see for the gross returns that, for a few funds, we can reject the null that they cannot beat the stock market. The identification of the funds differs between the parametric P-Values and the bootstrapped P-Values from the bootstrap procedure.
The simulated distribution tells us that the funds with the highest t-Statistics for the alpha estimated with the actual returns were just lucky. Fund with skills can be found above the median. Once expenses are taken into account, only one fund seems to have skills relative to the stock market. Given the multiple testing problem, we conclude that there is not sufficient evidence for the claim that some individual REMFs can outperform the stock market.
We can summarize the empirical evidence as follows. The active REMF industry can beat the passive sector benchmark on both net and gross returns. Once expenses are taken into account, the average investor receives more than the required compensation for the risk taken by the fund managers. The active REMF industry cannot beat the overall stock market. About 40% of individual REMFs can beat the U.S. real estate market, before the expenses. And 30% of fund mangers have enough skills to cover expenses. Investors in these funds receive on average more than just a compensation for the risk taken. The identification of these funds depends on the assumptions about the distribution of idiosyncratic returns. For instance, the bootstrapped distribution of the t-Statistic under the null indicates that the 'best' fund possesses genuine skills and was more than just lucky. This is relevant for investors, who want to find the best fund. Relative to the stock market, a few REMFs seem to be able to beat the market based on gross returns. Once the problem of multiple testing is taken into account, we find no firm evidence that individual REMFs can beat the stock market.
We also present the results using the combined benchmark including the sector -Wilshire index and the Carhart four factors, in table C7. The t-Statistics of gross alpha with significant parametric and bootstrapped P-Values above the 40% percentile indicates the existence of skilled managers. But after the deduction of expenses, the proportion of managers with genuine skills decreases to merely 10%.
Robustness checks
To check for the robustness of the result, we replicated the analysis with more bootstrap replications. 15 We conducted the empirical analysis with all funds that have at least 36 observation, which results in a larger sample size. The qualitative results of our analysis did not change. We also implemented the block bootstrap to account for possible autocorrelation in idiosyncratic returns. Again, this had only a 15 Results are nearly unchanged and available from authors upon request. minor impact on the qualitative results. 16 
Conclusion
We have examined the performance of the Real Estate Mutual Fund (REMF) industry as a whole and at individual fund level, and we have considered performance against a stock market benchmark and a real estate market benchmark. We have considered gross and net returns and we have used the cross-sectional bootstrap to separate genuine skills from luck.
Our key results are as follows. First, the actively-managed specialised REMF industry, as a whole, can beat the real estate market, and the outperformance still exists after consideration of expenses. Second, the REMF industry, as a whole, cannot beat the stock market at all. And the REMF industry also cannot beat the combined benchmark of both. Third, at the individual REMF level, while more than 30% of REMFs can outperform the real estate sector, even once the expenses are taken into account. The proportion shrinks to no more than 10%, when the combined benchmark consist of stock market and real estate market is applied.
The findings are further confirmed after a series of robustness checks against other benchmarks. Finally, we find no strong evidence for the existence of skills for any REMFs relative to stock market.
These findings are consistent with other findings in the literature, which provides weak evidence for outperformance. Our study adds to the literature by comparing both against real estate and general stock market benchmarks, and by separating skills from luck by the use of a cross-section bootstrap. We have undertaken some preliminary work on other mutual fund sectors and the tentative results suggest substantial differences across sectors: consumer goods funds and healthcare/biotechnology funds are able to beat the stock market benchmark; financial 16 Both results are available in appendix C. service funds, utility funds and natural resources funds cannot; and science and technology funds appear at both extremes of the distribution. We plan to develop this analysis.
It is possible that our results are dependent on the time period. We have also undertaken some preliminary work on this, which suggests that any outperformance for REMFs is restricted to the earlier part of our study period. However, the number of funds in the early part of the study is low and we need to undertake more robust analysis, including multiple sub-periods and a recursive analysis, to address this issue properly. There are three possible sets of explanations for period-specific relative performance. First, at the level of the individual fund, the skills of a particular manager may be important. For example, Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) and Barras et al. (2010) point to the flight of talented fund managers from mutual fund industry for other lucrative posts, such as in hedge funds. Second, as the market has matured, more competition for skilled staff and for underpriced investments may have reduced the opportunity for outperformance. Finally, different sectors will respond differently to macro-economic shocks -this is an issue we plan to address in the next stage of our research.
These results raise some general issues about the structure of the investment market. From an institutional economics perspective, the current structure should reflect the minimization of transaction costs and access to specialist information and skills by fund managers. There is no strong evidence of the latter so, why do specialist sector funds exist? From the perspective of an active investor with a multi-sector portfolio, sector mutual funds allow sector positions, either under or over weight, to be taken quickly. So, if the multi-sector managers believe they have forecasting skills, but not stock selection skills, they would adopt this approach. As some sector markets do outperform, and as some funds outperform in several sector markets, this appears to be a defensible strategy, although fund, as opposed to sector selection, clearly presents challenges. As the ability of individual sector funds to outperform may vary by sector, the decision on whether to select individual funds or to stick closer to a sector benchmark, should vary by sector. Similarly, for passive multi-sector investors, exposure to a specific sector may be best through a specialist manager, leaving a decision on whether to choose an active or a passive manager.
Our results suggest that, for real estate, actively managed funds in general outweigh passively manager funds, but request additional effort to pick stellar performers.
Appendix A REMFs Portfolio Exposure
Since the Lipper investment objective code on U.S. domestic REMFs has different definitions and fails to provide detailed region and sector decomposition of fund's portfolio investment. Therefore, all of the securities held by REMFs portfolios are identified manually in this study using the domiciled country and industry classification from Datastream, the CUSIP Master File, Bloomberg, and Financial Times.
For those funds with portfolio information missing in CRSP, we use the N-30D or N-Q filling from EDGAR 17 on-line database to fill in the gaps. In addition, there are some funds that altered their investment objectives from U.S. domestic to global or international. Part of their returns will be included into sample once it meets the Lipper classification of non-U.S. stock exposure no more than 25%.
The percent investing in sector i is calculated as:
M ktV al
The sectors in the Funds also invest in other sectors and derivatives like futures, swaps and options, which may cause negative holding positions in the portfolios.
[ Table C8 about here]
Appendix B Exclusion of Index Funds
To ensure our results are purely driven by fund manager active management, we also remove the passively operated index funds, by using the 'index fund flag' identifier in the CRSP database. However, strict use of this method would omit some index 
Appendix C Robustness Checks
Our bootstrap approach assumes the independent and identical distribution among the residuals, however, this strong assumption can be violated since the historical residuals may exhibit dependence and stationarity, thus calls for the block bootstrap. Instead of resampling each individual residual, we replace by resampling the subsets of consecutive values of residuals. The block of residuals should be optimal to reflect the significant autocorrelation among them accurately, yet not too long to consume time and efforts. According to Kosowski et al. (2006) , the optimal block length depends on the context in which the block bootstrap is applied. To be more precise, the optimal block length is set as T 1/3 to correct for variance or biased estimations. Therefore, it is clear that block bootstrap does not impose any restrictive assumptions on the error autocorrelation, and can be applied after autocorrelation is detected from the regression residuals. In this study, the block length is set as 7, and the results are presented in table C9. The results on funds sample with no less than 36 observations are also presented in table C10 for robustness check.
The bootstrapped p-values from block length 7 are more conservative than the bootstrapped p-value presented in baseline result. The amount of skills for top funds shrink even vanish as we take account of returns autocorrelation. Reducing the sample size as no less than 36 observations slightly smooths the bootstrapped p-value but overall causes no qualitative difference on the inferences.
[ Table C9 about here]
[ Table C10 about here] Table C6 : Performance of individual REMFs relative to the stock market: Presents estimated alpha and its t-Statistic for the period 1986-2011. Benchmark model is the Carhart regression from Eq. 3. The t-statistics are computed using Newey-West adjusted robust standard errors. P-values are for the t-Statistic that α = 0. The parametric P-Value comes from a standard normal distribution, the bootstrapped P-Value comes from the estimated empirical distribution of the t-Statistic under the null. Table C7 : Performance of individual REMFs relative to the real estate and stock market: Presents estimated alpha and its t-Statistic for the period 1986-2011. Benchmark model of combined factors from Eq. 2 and Eq. 3 is used, including the Wilshire index as the sector factor, and Carhart four factors. The t-statistics are computed using Newey-West adjusted robust standard errors. P-values are for the t-Statistic that α = 0. The parametric P-Value comes from a standard normal distribution, the bootstrapped P-Value comes from the estimated empirical distribution of the t-Statistic under the null. and Carhart model is for the stock market. The t-statistics are computed using Newey-West adjusted robust standard errors. P-values are for the t-Statistic that α = 0. The parametric P-Value comes from a standard normal distribution, the bootstrapped P-Value comes from the estimated empirical distribution of the t-Statistic under the null. The block bootstrapped is applied, with block T Table C10 : Performance of individual REMFs relative to the real estate & stock market: Presents estimated alpha and its t-Statistic for the period 1986-2011 on funds with no less than 36 observations. Benchmark models from Eq. 2 and from Eq. 3 are used, where the Wilshire index is the sector index and Carhart model is for the stock market. The t-statistics are computed using Newey-West adjusted robust standard errors. P-values are for the t-Statistic that α = 0. The parametric P-Value comes from a standard normal distribution, the bootstrapped P-Value comes from the estimated empirical distribution of the t-Statistic under the null.
